What is Moneyball?

"It's typical if you write a book, you want to be the hero. That is apparently what Beane has done."

-Joe Morgan

Are we really this confused?

Although this may be the craziest and most inaccurate of them all, many more crazy and inaccurate have been said about Michael Lewis’ 2003 book, Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game. Sports writers routinely use the term “Moneyball” to describe a wide variety of baseball scenarios, such as: teams with fat guys who can draw a walk but can’t play the field, teams who use any type of computer or math related concepts to evaluate players, and especially, any team with a general manager under the age of 40. But those who lump together all the “Moneyball” teams as young nerds obsessed with OPS are missing the point.

Moneyball isn’t about any of those things.

Put simply, Moneyball is a book about allocating limited resources efficiently, a topic not so surprising considering that Lewis is an economist. In the book, the Oakland A’s disregard defense and look for players with high OBP not because these players are significantly better, but because they are significantly cheaper. Because the A’s operate on an extremely limited budget, they are forced to look for players with skills that are undervalued by other teams. Consider the following two players:


Player A: excellent defense, average OBP, $2 million salary
Player B: average defense, excellent OBP, $1 million salary


In this example, the “Moneyball” team would probably take player B. And in the summer of 2002, when Michael Lewis was following the A’s, major league teams were faced with many decisions similar to this one. But, what if you reverse the salaries?


Player A: excellent defense, average OBP, $1 million salary
Player B: average defense, excellent OBP, $2 million salary


The vast majority of the sports media would lead you to believe that a “Moneyball” team would still take player B. But, they wouldn’t. How do I know? Because this is basically what happened to the value of baseball players from 2002-2006.

Other teams watched the A’s ride high OBP and low payrolls to 90 wins and began to copy the formula. Subsequently, the high OBP players became more expensive, while the defensive players became more undervalued. And the teams who were paying attention started to shift their focus. Consider these two opening day lineups for the Oakland A’s, one in 2002 and one in 2006:


2002
C: Ramon Hernandez
1B: Carlos Pena
2B: Randy Velarde
SS: Miguel Tejada
3B: Eric Chavez
LF: Jeremy Giambi
CF: Terrence Long
RF: David Justice
DH: Scott Hatteberg

Team Payroll Rank: 25th


2006
C: Jason Kendall
1B: Nick Swisher
2B: Mark Ellis
SS: Bobby Crosby
3B: Eric Chavez
LF: Jay Payton
CF: Mark Kotsay
RF: Milton Bradley
DH: Frank Thomas

Team Payroll Rank: 21st


Notice anything? The A’s sacrificed OBP for a vastly improved defense, especially in the outfield, while barely increasing their financial commitment relative to the other teams. In other words, they found that the bargains weren’t in OBP anymore, but instead in defensive players, and acted accordingly.

This, my friends, is “Moneyball.”

Is the Sky Really Falling?

Chicken Little strikes again. Two years removed from their last World Championship, the Florida Marlins followed a moderately successful season by trading away virtually their entire starting lineup. Again.

Although sports writers repeatedly killed the Marlins this off-season and nearly everyone expects the team to be abysmal, I’m not so sure these people are looking at the whole picture. Not only is this not the same situation as the 1997-98 firesale, but I would argue that the 2005-06 off-season moves will actually improve the Marlins in the long term. Let’s look at the moves in question (and one non-move):


1. Kept Dontrelle Willis and Miguel Cabrera

People claiming that the Marlins “gave away their entire roster” are overlooking one basic fact: they kept their best hitter and their best pitcher. And these are no ordinary best players. Cabrera is a 23-year-old phenom with nearly three seasons of experience, the last one of which produced 33 HR, 116 RBI, .301 BA and a .946 OPS (good for 6th in the National League). Willis was similarly excellent, finishing 22-10 with a 2.63 ERA. And, oh yeah, he finshed 2nd in the NL Cy Young voting.


2. Acquired RHP Gabriel Hernandez and OF Dante Brinkley from the New York Mets in exchange for C Paul Lo Duca.

Apparently “intangibles” means “can’t hit after the all-star break.” Lo Duca made $4.6 million in 2005 to produce a .714 OPS (one of the worst in MLB among catchers) and has never been noted for his defense. Brinkley may be a marginal prospect at best, but Gaby Hernandez, a 19-year-old pitcher who tore up the South Atlantic League in 2005, was rated as the #4 Mets prospect by Baseball America. Even if Hernandez doesn’t pan out, the Marlins were wise to dispose of Lo Duca’s contract.


3. Acquired RHP Travis Bowyer and RHP Scott Tyler from the Twins for 2B Luis Castillo.

Castillo is a decent enough player (high OBP, good glove), but his days of 40+ Stolen bases are long gone. He’s 30 years old, stole 10 bases last year, and it’s likely his best days are behind him. Bowyer is the prize of the deal for the Marlins; he’s a future closer with a 99mph fastball. Add that to the fact that they saved $5 million and this one looks like another winner.


4. Acquired 1B Mike Jacobs, RHP Yusmeiro Petit and INF Grant Psomas from the New York Mets in exchange for 1B Carlos Delgado and cash.

Yes, Delgado is very good. But, he’s also: 34 years old, signed through 2008 at top dollar, and an atrocious defensive first baseman. Like Lo Duca and Castillo, he is more likely to enter the decline phase of his career than to put up numbers like he did in previous seasons. On the other hand, Petit is a 21-year-old top pitching prospect who is nearly ready for the show and Jacobs hit .310 in 112 major league at-bats last year. Even if they don’t combine to equal the production of Delgado, the Marlins are better off spending the Delgado money elsewhere in 2007 and 2008.


5. Acquired SS Hanley Ramirez, RHP Anibal Sanchez, RHP Harvey Garcia, and RHP Jesus Delgado from the Boston Red Sox in exchange for RHP Josh Beckett, 3B Mike Lowell and RHP Guillermo Mota.

Lowell and Mota are done like Adam, but giving up Beckett really hurts. Beckett, though, may be as unknown a quantity as many of the pitching prospects received by the Marlins. Yes, he dominated the Yankees in the 2003 World Series. But, he also has a career record of 41-34 and has never thrown more than 180 innings in a season due to numerous DL trips. Beckett may break out in the next few years, but then again so may Sanchez or Ramirez. Ramirez will open the 2006 season as Florida’s starting shortstop and Sanchez is not far behind.


So, the Marlins kept their two best players and received a plethora of young promising prospects, some of whom are ready to help the Marlins in 2006 all for Josh Beckett and a bunch of overpaid, overrated veterans. Even though the 2006 Marlins will almost assuredly finish worse than last year’s team, prospects gained in the deals of this off-season will be helping the Marlins for years to come at a much cheaper price than those who were traded away (most of whom will be out of the league within 3 years).